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The day of reckoning has come, as an earlier native Ghanaian pro¬
phesied. After more than 100 years of British colonial rule, Ghana
became effectively governed as a one-party state under the leadership of
Kwame Nkrumah. To explore possible relationships between British colonial
rule and the emergencf of the one-party authoritarian system In Ghana Is
the aim of this thesis.
It Is not easy to extract any clear pattern from the events which
have taken place since Ghana assumed her role as an Independent member
of the British Commonwealth. The eventual return to political Inde¬
pendence was a reality before any definite party system had emerged and
before the large-scale Induction of native participation Into the central
government was a decade old. Parliamentary Ideas and traditions were
topics studied In textbooks then, not actualities, experienced nor nur¬
tured to any great extent under the system of crown colony rule as It
operated In the Gold Coast during the last four generations. Although
the British Administrations attempted to Introduce a British pattern of
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political life into their West African colonies, the pattern has undergone
mutations which seem at times to bear no resemblance to the original
model•
With the introduction of British rule in the nineteenth century,
British Administrations began to exercise a policy which gave priority
to state interest over individual liberties in any given situation. In
Ghana, the tendency toward arbitrary action on the part of the executive,
the close governmental control of voluntary organizations, and the cen¬
tralized economic progranming dates back to the incipient authoritarian
proclivity evidenced by the mode of colonial administration in the Gold
Coast Colony. This propensity toward strong-arm government seemingly
dates back to the British colonial experience in rebellious North America
after which the British applied a more stringent, authoritarian type of
policy in the remaining colonies, particularly where there were few or
no white settlers with which to deal.
The authoritarian type of governmental policy has continued since
independence in 1957, for the central government of Ghana has achieved
great concentration of power. Those who hoped that parliamentary democ¬
racy would flourish have been dismayed and alarmed by actions taken since
independence--deportat ions, detentions without trial, destoolment of
chiefs, the enactment of stringent treason and sedition laws, censorship
of newspapers—a11 this despite safeguards included in the original
constitution. The opposition parties have been harassed and almost
stifled for the opposition had responded with accusations of totali¬
tarian tactics and dictatorship against Kwame Nkrumah, who was the chief
executive.
The Ghanaian administration followed a policy very like that of the
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earlier British colonial rulers, an authoritarian policy with the prin¬
ciple of advocating obedience of authority as opposed to permitting the
exercise of individual liberties. Three areas warrant consideration in
the examination of the authoritarian one-party system in Ghana; (1) the
scope and practice of arbitrary executive action, (2) the close govern¬
mental association with voluntary organization, and (3) centralized
economic planning.
The Gold Coast in the Nineteenth Century
The nineteenth century period of British colonial administration was
rife with examples of arbitrary action on the part of the chief executive
who rarely accounted in any way for the actions he undertook.
History
Discovered by the Portuguese in 1471, the Gold Coast has been visited
since then by most of the great trading nations of Europe who subsequently
established a chain of fortresses along the coast. British interest in
the Gold Coast dates from the early part of the seventeenth century when
they competed with the Dutch for a share in the slave trade. The slave
trading activities may well have been sordid, but they were also lucra¬
tive. By the middle of the eighteenth century, the annual export was
estimated to have been from 10,000 to 3G»000 slaves. The British were
concerned at that time with maintaining relations with indisenous govern¬
ments which were conducive to securing a maximum supply of slaves. When
the slave trade was outlawed by an Act of Parliament in 1807, the British
made plans to leave the Gold Coast but protests at this move from merchants
and Fanti chiefs led the government to reconsider and to assume governmental
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controls from Sierra Leone.^
Maclean's Administration
Captain George Maclean arrived in I83O to serve as the first gover¬
nor. Maclean assumed that the responsibility for establishing and main¬
taining the British kind of peace and order in the area assigned to him.
The motivating force behind his efforts in debatable. Metcalfe feels that
Maclean's policies were neither primarily patriotic or even philanthropic.
Maclean was apparently not influenced by the humanitarian, anti-slave
trade party of this day which wanted to see British rule extended into
the African interior. Nominee and agent of businessmen, Maclean had
basically business-like motives and methods. Intertribal warfare was
bad for trade, disrupting the existing business interests. "It was this
down-to-earth consideration that led Maclean to endeavor to organize into
some sort of cohesion the people of the Southern Gold Coast and to compose
their differences with their Ashanti neighbors on terms that held promise
of mutual satisfaction and prosperity."^ Page attributes Maclean's motive
force to the fact that Maclean was convinced that British influence and
British guidance were the best means of redeeming tropical Africa from
the Barbarism typified for them by the slave trade and the practice of
human sacrifice, "and he wanted to extend British influence, and in par¬
ticular British ideas of justice, throughout that country, so that the life
^Lord Hailey, Native Administration in the British African Terri¬
tories, Part II (London: 1951). P. 195 and the London Times, March 5.
1957, p. 7.
^G. E. Metcalfe, Maclean of the Gold Coast (London: Oxford Univer¬
sity Press, 1962), p. ix.
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of Its peoples would be more peaceful, better-ordered atxl more rewarding.^
Although there may be disagreement about Maclean's motives, there
Is little debate about his actions* Noted for his single minded deter¬
mination, Maclean was opinionated; a man with a mission who was Impatient
and even brutal with men who were not In sympathy with his alms or men
whose Integrity he doubted. Such men sometimes became his Intense ene¬
mies, mapping fanatical attempts to call Maclean Into disrepute and to
undermine his position. Those who know and admired Maclean were often
just as fanatical In their loyalty and admiration.
The first recorded Instance of deportation In the Gold Coast con¬
cerned a man who managed to fall Into Maclean's category of fools and
knaves, a category reserved for those who opposed or criticized any of
his policies. Burgayne, Captain of the guard, arrived In April, 1835, and
was suspended two months later. "Burgayne seems to have occupied this
period of grace chiefly by threatening to assassinate Maclean, trying to
Incite the garrison at Cape Coast to mutiny, and above all by composing
numerous petitions and protests which were signed by various merchants
andcchlefs, but never by their real author."^ He was served with a depor¬
tation order; the council paid for his passage to Madeira.
Maclean pursued a policy of extending British jurisdiction and
Influence beyond the littoral. His administration was noted for Maclean's
devetalling of the judicial and executive functions of the central Govern¬
ment. Maclean and his Council arranged treaties with the Ashanti, adjudi¬
cated In quarrels between tribes and Indisputes within tribes. He
^J.D. Fage, "The Administration of George Maclean on the Gold Coast,
1830-44," Transactions of the Gold Coast and Toqoland Historical Society,
Vol. I, part IV (I953),p. 306.
^Ibld.. p. 109.
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organized and conducted armed expeditions against chiefs who were dis¬
turbing the peace, held such chiefs to ball for good behavior, arranged
the trial by chiefs of natives accused of murdering fellow natives. The
governor urged the Danish and Dutch authorities on the coast to act like¬
wise or at least not to Interfere with what the British were doing.
Maclean engaged In various types of activities In connection with many
groups and Individuals who were not legally subject to his jurisdiction,
since they were neither British subjects nor resident In British terri¬
tory. With few exceptions, Maclean's Intervention seems to have worked
well as he widened thessphere of British Influence by Interesting himself
In the suppression of panyaring (the forcible seizure of the person or
property in order to secure reducess or restitution for a grievance or
a debt), the abolition of human sacrifice, the supervision of trials and
executions for murder. Maclean exercised his extra-territorial juris¬
diction on the grounds that It would lead to an Increase In peace and
prosperity for the peoples of the Gold Coast. Pages writes that the fact
of native acquiescence joined with the trade figures to show that Maclean
was right, and that his activities filled a genuine need.^
Because he had little choice In the matter, Maclean worked on and
through the local chiefs, but there was no Indication that he ever did or
could have contemplated sharing the crucial decisions with them. His
successors attempted to legalize Into formal and enduring Institutions
the authority that Maclean had acquired over the tribes by his personal
Influence.^
^Ibld.. pp. 112-118.
^G. E. Metcalfe, After Maclean. Transactions of the Gold Coast and
Toqoland Historical Society, Vol. I, Part V (1955), p. 147.
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British control was first legalized in the Bond of 1844 which gave
de facto recognition of the jurisdiction which had grown up under Maclean's
influence in the protectorate. In I85O the Gold Coast was admiaistratively
separated from Sierra Leone and given its own gcvernment with executive
and legislative councils under the British Settlement Acts of 1843*^
Arbitrary Actions
British policy throughout the next period was characterized by vacil¬
lation and frequent misunderstanding between the British authorities and
one section or another of the Gold Coast peoples. The British decided to
remain, as Bourret saw it, because of pressures exerted by various groups
in England. Although commercial and political interests were probably
the strongest of these groups the metropolitan government also had to take
account of the idealistic element that wished to continue the Christian
missionary endeavors and Western education which were introduced in
0
Maclean's time*
The root of many of the difficulties between the government and the
natives was that the British administrators, often arbitrary in their
exercise of power, followed no consistent policy. A typical example was
the action taken against two troublesome chiefs in April 1868. Under
governmental instructions, their houses were pulled down, their property
confiscated, and they were declared outlaws. Ellis comments that
^W. E. F, Ward, A History of Ghana (London: George Allen and Unwin,
Ltd., 1958), p. 194.
®F. M. Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence (Stanford, I960),
p. 19.
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...in November it became lawful to do that for which in
April Kwasi Atta (one of the punished chiefs) had been
outlawed and his property confiscated and destroyed.^
Preferring to remain aloof from tribal controversies, the British fre¬
quently blundered in actions finally taken, as in the case where a
chief's demand for arbitration was mistaken for a threat of war.
In December, 1866, John Aggri was arrested, deposed, and exiled with
out trial for sending what the Governor termed a seditious letter. In a
letter, addressed to Colonel Conron, Aggri protested against "the per¬
petual annoyances and insults tl^t you persistently and perserveringly
continue to practice on me in my capacity as legally constituted king."
The letter continued:
I presume your object is to endeavor all in your power to incite
me and my people to enact more of those fearful things that took
place in Jamaica...However much you may wish to have me and my
people under martial law, you will never have that pleasure...
I shall appeal for the last time and then if some tangible satis¬
faction is not accorded to me and those whose interests I am
bound to protest it will be time enough for me to adopt those
measures which will ensure to me and my people something unlike
the slavery that you are endeavoring to place us in. I am
fully aware that all your vengeance on me owes its origins to
the fact that I exposed you for those fearful acts that took
place on 4th September 1865, when my people were butchered
by you* soldiers, some by your own personal superintendence...
I shall not omit to bring before the British government at the
Downing Street your personal attack upon king Ortabil....It is
possible for me to endure your tyranny, annoyances and abuses
any longer, nor will I be subject to the disunion that you are
daily endeavoring to create amongst my chiefs and others...
four prisoners were discharged from my town prison...for the
last time I desire to call your attention to this last gross
outrage, and should it occur again the responsibility rests
at your door.'®
E. F. Ward, op. cit., p. 238.
'®W. Walton Claridge, A History of The Gold Coast and Ashanti. 2 Vols
(London: John Murrary, 1915), Vol I, p. 553*
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Aggri was quietly arrested the same day the letter was delivered,
put aboard a mail steamer, and sent to Sierra Leone. Two days later the
governor issued a proclamation declaring Aggri to be no longer king and
abolishing his courts and prison. Aggri lived in Sierra Leone for three
years until he was permitted to return to Cape Coast as a private citi¬
ll
zen.
Fanti chiefs met at Mankesim in October I87I, and formed a confedera¬
tion with its own written constitution that would have supplanted a con¬
federation for the Mosaic of small independent Fanti states. This
document which provided for the enactment of legislation for the con¬
federation, as well as for its own system of public works, education, and
judiciary, was presented by a deputation of the confederation to Mr.
Salmon, the acting administrator. Mr. Salmon seems to have regarded the
proceedings as a personal affront and to have completely lost his temper.
Coming to the conclusion that he faced a dangerous conspiracy, he took
prompt action to stifle it at the outset. A stormy scene terminated the
presentation of the docunents, and Mr. Salmon hastily had the officers of
the confederation, namely, W. E. Davidson, J. F. Amissah, and J. H. Breu,
arrested on a charge of treason and confined in jail. The next morning
warrants for the arrest of the others were issued, and some of them were
later executed. These events were duly reported to the secretary of
state who took a far less serious view of the case. He immediately ordered
the release of the accused from jail and the story of all proceedings
against them.^^
^^bid.. p. 554.
^^^bid. pp. 616-619 and Ward, p. 256.
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When the British decided to annex Ashanti in I895, the governor
demanded that Prempeh» the Ashantehene (superior chief of the Ashanti),
accept a British resident in Kumasi, the capital. Prempeh had sent a
delegation to England and wanted to make no commitments until it returned.
The delegation returned from an unfruitful trip, and so Prempeh acceded
to the occupation of Kumasai by a British expeditionary force in January
1896. The governor of the Gold Coast Colony and this official met
Prempeh publicly and reminded the chief that he had not honored former
agreements with the coastal government. Offering not to depose Prempeh
if he submitted immediately and paid an indemnity of 50,000 ounces of
gold, the governor demanded a reply. Prempeh slipped off his golden
bracelet and his sandals, a sign of deference to a superior, and made
obeisance to the governor. Prempeh then asked for the protection of the
British crown; he offered to pay 68O ounces of gold immediately and to pay
the balance in installments. Demanding security for the balance, the
governor took Prempeh and his retinue~-the queen mother, his father, his
two uncles, his brother, two war chiefs, and three other chiefs--as
prisoners to the coast. The coast turned out to be the Seychelles Islands
in the Indian Ocean, and there Prempeh and his attendants remained until
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they were allowed to return to Ashanti in 1924. ^
According to some observers, such affairs typify the course of admin¬
istration through the torn of the century. There were frequent changes of
policy by the government which could be represented by hostile or biased
critics as broken promises. The Government seemingly made little effort
’3ward, pp. 302-307
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to explain itself or to refute unfavorable reports and carried out its
intentions despite any opposition* This was often taken as fresh evi¬
dence of the government's indifference to the wishes of the people and
served to strengthen the suspicion of the government's evil intentions
on future occasions* "A great deal of political energy was thus allowed
to go to waste which might have been utilized for constructive work*"^^
Responsibility for Arbitrary Actions
The entire blame cannot be laid on the local British officials*
There are several aspects of the situation to consider* First, although
the government was committed to a policy of educational expansion and
gradual advancement toward self-government, many British officials feared
and distrusted the educated African leaders* These officials were all too
ready to label them agitators, preferring to deal with them as little as
possible* Secondly, with the spread of literacy, the African press
developed which was often irresponsible, carrying an appeal no government
paper could hope to rival*^^ Thirdly, the British Colonial officer
followed no consistent or coordinated policy* He seemed to fear the
expense, the possible jealousy of other nations, as well as the new
responsibilities that every change of policy or accession of territory
involved* Above all was the grave handicap of a procession of colonial
ministers and secretaries, each having hiw own policy and theory as to
colonial rule and colonial expansion or withdrawal* Harris points out




thirty colonial secretaries, served from four to six years, while the
other twenty-four averaged scarcely a year and one-fifth apiece.'^
Third, colonial governments generally were given a free rein because of
public apathy on the part of the citizens in the metropolitan country.
Cohen mentions the relative lack of interest in Africa by the British
press and the minimal parliamentary interest and opinion.
African Criticism of Arbitrary Actions
Africanus B. Horton, a native Surgeon on the Colonial Staff in the
Gold Coast, presents a representative opinion which sums up the consensus
of those interested in colonial affairs at this time when he writes to
Lord Granville, Secretary of State for the Colonies, in May I870t
The Governor or Administrator of the Gold Coast should be a man
of tact, resolution, and great independence. Whilst firm in
his decision, which should only be arrived at after matured
consideration, he should be most magnanimous and conciliatory to
the inhabitants over whom he exercises supreme authority.
I verily believe, my lord, that in the government of a semi
barbarous race, where the aim is to bring up the governed
rapidly to advancement in industrial pursuits, education, and
general social condition, A Little Despotism is absolutely
necessary. But it must be understood that this despotism must
not be used for the exertion of uncalled for arbitrary power,
which an intelligent race might think, simply from its superior
intelligence, it ought to exact over the others as being less
informed. But it should be more on principles of equity, having
this object in view--the material advancement of people. It
will, however, be a most deplorable thing for any government
if this despotism is exercised for revenge, or for the pur¬
pose of satisfying private pique.
D. Harris, Europe and Africa (Cambridge: Houghton Mifflin
Co., 1927), p. 11.
^^Sir Andrew Cohen, British Policy In Changing Africa (Evanston,
111.* Northwestern University Press, 1959), p. 82.
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Africanus B. Horton, Letters on the Political Condition of the
Gold Coast (London: William John Johnson, 1870), pp. 137-13^.
CHAPTER II
THE GOLD COAST UNDER CROWN COLONY RULE
Crown colonies, acquired by conquest, purchase, occupation, or
treaty, were ruled under a system whereby effective power belonged to
the governor and his predominantly British acbninistration. A legislative
council which included some African members sometimes existed, but in
practice, the council served not as a parliament, but as a forum for the
ventilation of grievances and as a platform for publicizing goverranent
policies.
The Gold Coast
Ghana, originally a complex of multipled dependencies—Gold Coast
(1821 crown colony), Ashanti (1901 colony). Northern Territories (1901
protectorate), and British Togoland (1923 mandated territory)—deve1oped
its form of government by a series of letters patent and orders-in>
council, along the usual lines of colonial evolution. Power rested first
in the hands of the governor and his officials. This power was shared
gradually with unofficial, then African, and finally, elected representa¬
tives. Under the crown colony system the focal point of interest was the
operation of the machinery of central government.
The Governor
Colonial regulations state that the governor was the single and
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supreme authority in the colony, responsible to the representative of
the sovereign. The governorship was the central institution of the
crown colony system because he embodied so many offices* representative
of the crown with power to exercise the royal prerogative of mercy; head
of the executive government, a sort of prime minister; president of the
legislature like the speaker of the House of Commons, with power to veto
any bill passed? "As the Governor of the Gold Coast put it, before the
constitutional changes of 1950 he was an autocrat."^ As ruler, envoy,
and civil servant, the governor was likely to take any uninvited criticism
as an attack against the rule of law, against the sovereign and govern-
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ment represented.
The September 26, 1901 Order-in-Counci1 of The Gold Coast stated:
It shall be competent for the Governor of the Gold Coast Colony,
by and with the advice and consent of the Legislative Council
of the said Colony, to make laws for the peace, order, and good
government of the said territory.
As and from the date of the coming into operation of the
Order, all laws and Ordinances which shall at such date be in
force in the territories heretofore known as the Gold Coast
Colony, shall take effect within the limits of the Order, and
shall remain in force therein until the same shall have been
altered or repealed by the Governor of the Gold Coast Colony,
by and with the advice and consent of the Legislative Council,
or by His Majesty.3
On this same day, the Ashanti Order-in-Council, almost identical with the
Northern Territories Order-in-Council, was promulgated:
The Governor of the Gold Coast Colony may, on His Majesty's
behalf, exercise all powers and jurisdiction of His Majesty
•^David E. Apter, The Gold Coast in Transition (Princeton, N.J.:
1955), p. 131.
^Barbu Niculescu, Colonial Planning: A Comparative Study (London:
George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 195^), p. 40.
■^John Mensah Sarbah, Fanti National Constitution (London: William
Clowes and Sons, Ltd., 1906), p. 172.
15
within Ashanti, and to that end may take or cause to be taken
all such measures, and may do or cause to be done all such
matters and things therein as are lawful, and as in the in¬
terest of His Majesty's service he may think expedient, subject
to such instructions as he may from time to time receive from
His Majesty's or through a Secretary of State.*.*
The Governor may appoint a Chief Conunissioner and so many
fit personages, in the interest of His Majesty's service, he
may think necessary to be Commissioner, Judges, Magistrates,
or other Officers, and may define from time to time the dis¬
tricts wiUiin which such Officers shall respectively discharge
their functions.
Every such Officer may exercise such powers and authorities
as the Governor may, with the like approval assign to him, sub¬
ject nevertheless to such directions and instructions as the
Governor may from time to time think fit to give him. The
appointment of such Officers shall not abridge, alter, or effect
the right of the Governor to execute and discharge all the powers
and authorities hereby conferred upon him.
The Governor may, subject to confirmation by a Secretary of
State, remove any Officer so appointed.
In the exercise of the powers and authorities hereby con¬
ferred upon him, the Governor may, amongst other things, from time
to time by Ordinance provide for the administration of justice,
the raising of revenue, and generally for the peace, order, and
good government of Ashanti, and of all persons therein, including
the prohibition and punishment of acts tending to disturb the
public peace.
The Governor, in issuing such Ordinances, shall respect any
native laws by which the civil relations of any native chiefs,
itribes, populations under His Majesty's protection are now regu¬
lated, except so far as the same may be incompatible with the due
exercise of His Majesty's power and jurisdiction, or clearly
injurious to the welfare of the said natives.
The Governor may, upon sufficient cause to him appearing,
suspend from the exercise of his office any person holding or
exercising any office with Ashanti whether appointed by the
Governor or by virtue of any Commission of Warrant granted, or
which may be granted, by His Majesty in His Majesty's name or
under His Majesty's authority, which suspension shall continue
and have effect only until His Majesty's pleasure therein shall
be signified to the Governor by a Secretary of State.^
Control of Colonial Governors
The crown colony system of government supposedly had built-in con¬
stitutional safeguards against the abuse of powers conferred on the local
Sbid*. pp. 174-176.
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colonial administrator. If the governor over-stepped the bounds of his
authority, the secretary of state in London was supposed to call him to
account. As one governor put it when discussing the possible abuse of
power, there were two very good reasons that such an abuse of his powers
would be impossible; "One is, that I do not want to, and the other is
that the Secretary of State would not allow it."^ One would hardly dare
voice any criticism of these lofty sentiments. These administrators did
not seem willing to admit the possibility that a local official or even a
cabinet member might at times misinterpret his trust. Conmenting on this
system of colonial government, a native wrotei
What system is this which places in the hands of the
Governor, as the obedient servant of the Colonial Secretary,
a power beyond that exercised by the Sovereign. Emperor-King
of the British Dominions: A curious arrangement this, surely,
by which the Governor is not responsible to the taxpayers, who
keep the machine going, and who do really know what is good
for them, but to an overtasked official, some 3*000 miles away,
who may or may not be a capable man, and tfho gleans his infor¬
mation as to the local conditions from his obedient servant,
the Governor!6
Theoretically, the governor functioned under the directions of the
British government, yet it is debatable whether much control was really
exercised. Sir Winston Churchill said, "We could not govern the colonies
from Downing Street and we do not try.Jeffries writes that the crux
of the problem revolves on what is meant by "govern." In a crown colony
the governor had very considerable latitude of action—or inaction—on
^Martin Wight, The Gold Coast Legislative Council (London: Faber
and Faber, Ltd., 1947), p. 84.
^Casely Hayford, Gold Coast Native Institutions (London: Sweet
and Maxwell, Ltd., 1903), p. 125*
^Charles Jeffries, Transfer of Power (New York: Frederick Praeger,
1961), p. 35.
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the broader matters of policy. On the other hand, he had very little
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latitude on certain matters of detail. If the governor decided It was
wise to reorganize the whole system of land tenure of his territory—*a
decision affecting the lives and fortunes of all the Inhabitants—the
metropolitan government would be content to trust the judgment and experi¬
ence of the man on the spot. Yet If the governor wanted to Increase his
budget by a hundred pounds, the government In Britain was sure to take
note.
The Executive Council
The crown colony council was composed of two divisions, the executive
council and the legislative council. The executive council had Its counter¬
part In the English privy council. This body was composed of those
officials who headed the principal government departments and unofficial
members. Wight writes that the appearance of unofficial members signal
the beginning of the long evolution that would transform the executive
council Into a cabinet. The executive advised the governor In his execu¬
tive capacity on policy, sets the agenda for legislative council sessions,
and served as the disciplinary authority for the members of the civil
service In the colony. Even though the governor must consult the council,
he may override it. Thus, the “governor in council” has at various times
and places been defined as meaning the governor acting with the advice
g
of the council, but not necessarily In accordance with the advice rendered.
Qlbld.
^Martin Wight, British Colonial Constitutions (London: Oxford
University Press, 1952), p. 16.
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The Legislative Council
The legislative council, being the legislative body of the colony,
was the more important of the two councils. This body of ex-officio
members (heads of administrative departments), civil service nominees
by the governor, and unofficial members (private citizens not holding
any government office) served as an advisory group to the governor who
was obliged to consult it, but not necessarily to head it. The legis¬
lative council was a kind of self-perpetuating body in which the oppo¬
sition was powerless to resist. "As the form of the Legislative Council
was not parliamentary, so its psychology was paternalistic and not
democratic."^®
Sir Hugh Clifford, governor during World War I, commented on the
theory of the legislative council with an official majorityx
There is a great difference between a Legislative Council
and a House of Parliament. In the latter you have a Government
in contradistinction to an Opposition, and if the Opposition
is strong enough it can turn the Government out and take its
place. In a Legislative Council, on the other hand, in no cir¬
cumstances whatever, can the unofficial members displace the
official members and take over their duties from them. There
is no such thing in such an Assembly as a Government and an
Opposition—instead we have to realize that we form a single
corporate Body all of whose members are working equally for
the attainment of a single end--the prosperity of the Gold
Coast Colony.^ ^
Operation of the Legislative Council
Thus, an examination of the crown colony system of government in
operation shows that it did not closely resemble the metropolitan model,
the parliamentary pattern in Great Britain. The onus of dealing with the
^®Wight, The Gold Coast Legislative Council, p. 82.
^hbid., p. 77.
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disbursement of public money was put directly on the governor, for only
he could initiate legislation involving finance* The governor had the
power to veto in relation to all legislation passed. Council proceedings
varied little from one session to another, from one year to the next.
Bills were introduced only by official members, and they, too, put most
motions and seconds. Expressions of opinion were seemingly tolerated,
but not necessarily heeded, a situation giving rise to feelings of frus¬
tration on the part of the African members, one of whom expressed himself
as followst
Your Excellency, we respectfully urge that in all matters
affecting this country and its interests we might be given the
freedom of discussing them dispassionately, and that the view
of the Secretary of State being as it were brought in now and
again to influence discussion one way or the other, is unfor¬
tunate, and I am emphasizing the point once more that although
the Secretary of State has given his view, we might yet be free
to give ours by our own conviction.^2
Opposition on the part of the African members also arose because
they had no opportunity to take part in policy formulations, as these
were made in the executive council meetings. This meant that only the
details of a bill were dealt with by the legislative council, for the
principles had been decided previously by the government. Hayford said
of this practice that it set a dangerous principle—that the ultimate
authority, ministerially and judicially, rested in the government (execu¬
tive) and not in the people.^^
This legislative council in action did not coincide with Wight's
definition of a parliament, "an arena where conflicts of organized interests
12
Gold Coast, Legislative Council Debates, Session 1921-1922 (Accra:
Government Press), p. 431.
^3ibid.. p. 516.
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are fought out in debate and effective compromises arrived at, which
implies the existence of party.'*'^ More than one governor looked upon
the council as a platform for publicizing government policies, rather
than as an incipient parliament. The key aspect of crown colony govern¬
ment lies in the principal of subordination; the legislative branch of
the government is subordinate to and controlled by the executive branch.
This control is effected, not by restricting the legislative council
members' sphere of authority as legislators, but by ensuring that the
powers they enjoy shall be exercised as desired by the executive.
Role of the Opposition
There has been considerable interest manifested in the question as
to whether official members of the legislative council are bound to vote
with the government, that is, to vote in accordance with state govern¬
ment policy. The standard answer given to queries in the House of Com¬
mons and from interested natives in the colony was that the officer of
the government must consider himself as an integral part of the govern¬
ment. As such, he is bound to support the policy of the government, for
being part of the executive government, he was obliged to obey the royal
commands conveyed by the Secretary of State, in his legislative as well
as executive capacity. On infrequent questions of religion or moral
import, the officer might be excused by the governor from taking part in
objectionable measures, but in the normal course of events, the officer
was expected to and did vote in accordance with official policy,
^^ight. The Gold Coast Legislative Council, p. 87.
'^Kathleen M. Stahl, British and Soviet Colonial Systems (New York;
Frederick Praeger, 1951)» p. 41.
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regardless of whether the coarse presented accorded with his personal
views and opinions. Putting the matter succinctly, Sarbah said, "To
him (the official member) it is a question of being dismissed and losing
his livelihood if he does not register his vote for the Government as he
is told."^^
The non«officia1 members were a perpetual minority group in the
legislative council.It might be supposed that they were expected to
render free criticism during council sessions, but such was not the case.
The non-official members were also expected to support the government
policies. Hayford says that their province was not so much to criticize
as to advise.When advising, they had to do it in such a way as to
fall in with the view momentarily entertained by the government.
Administrative Aides
District officers were employed in the areas outside the Gold Coast
Colony, in Ashanti, and in the Northern Territories. As chief adminis¬
trator in the area, the district officer worked under the governor's
direction as the representative of the central government in the crown
colony. The officer was delegated a larger amount of power and authority
in order that he might deal wi th a wide range of problems—labor, comnerce,
land tenure, judicial matters. Sutton says that the district officers
^%arbah, p. 123.
^^Wight, The Gold Coast Legislative Council, p. 268. A table of
Legislative Council membership under the 1925 constitution shows the
following: an official majority of 16 (5 ex-officio members of the
executive council, 8 ex-officio members not of the executive council, 2
nominated official members, the governor with an original and casting
vote); an unofficial minority of 14 (6 provincial members, 3 municipal
members, 5 European unofficial members); extraordinary members.
^^Hayford, p. 123.
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in charge of territories were chiefs, not merely acbninistrators. They
served as police, magistrates, and "omnicompetent executives who might
19
cajole and listen to complaints, but in the end told people what to do."
Weaknesses in the Crown Colony System
In view of preparation for eventual self-rule, the weaknesses in the
system of crown colony government were inherent in its very structure.
First, the principle of an official majority in the legislative council
enabled any government measure to be carried even in the teeth of oppo¬
sition by the African members. The arts of accommodation and conciliation
were frequently ignored. This factor was responsible for a great amount
of apathy and frustration on the part of colonial politicians with regard
to the governing of their country. Second, the arrangement of the execu¬
tive council precluded African membership until after World War II.
African politicians were justifiably suspicious about the meetings of the
council where they could easily imagine that diabolical stratagems were
being made by the government. Third, the legislative and executive forms
of government were restricted to the capital and surrounding area. Thus,
Ashanti was not represented in the legislative council until 1946, and
the Northern Territories not until later. There resulted a decided lack
of constitutional experience on the natives' part, through no fault of
their own. Fourth, the system of nominated membership favored the mem-
20
bership of those holding moderate opinions.
iq
•^Francis X. Sutton, "Authority and Authoritarianism in New Africa,"
In R. 0. Tilman and T. Cole, eds. The Nigerian Political Scene (Durham,
N.C.j Duke University Press, 1962), p. 278.
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T. 0. Elias, Government and Politics in Africa (New York* Asia
Publishing House, 196^), pp. 42-45 and t. 6. Elias, Ghana and Sierra Leone,
Vol. X of The British Commonwealth: The Development of Its Laws and
Constitutions (London; Stevens and Sons, Ltd., 1962), p. 37*
CHAPTER III
GOLD COAST GOVERNORSHIPS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
In order to furnish a framework within which to evaluate the policies
of the administration of Ghana, the outstanding features of several gover¬
norships of the first half of the twentieth century warrant examination.
Clifford's Adninistrati on
Sir Hugh Clifford's adninistration may be noted for the legalization
of the personal power of the chief executive. Clifford governed during
World War I and, therefore, many of the measures of his administration
bear the mark of the war crisis. Censorship was established in August,
1914. The governor was given wide emergency powers--enemy property con¬
trol and disposal ordinance. Another ordinance gave indemnity for acts
necessitated by the outbreak of war. Early in the hostilities, Togoland
came under the British flag. German merchants stranded there were left
alone until 1916 when the governor found it necessary to deport them. In
1916 and 1917 German missionaries were also deported. An ordinance which
provided for the deportation of suspects came into effect in 1918.^
Guqqisberq's Adninistration
The next administration emphasized centralized economic planning to
^Sir Charles Lucas, The Gold Coast and the War (Londont Oxford Uni¬
versity Press, 1920), pp. 1^-30.
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an unprecedented degree; governmental ties with voluntary organizations
and increased scope for arbitrary executive action are also evident. Sir
Gordon Guggisberg* one of the most popular governors ever sent to the
Gold Coast, arrived in 1919* One of his first moves was to outline a
ten-year development plan for 1919-1929. His aim was the '‘general pro¬
gress of the people in the Gold Coast towards a higher state of civiliza-
tion."2 The plan outlined development in several areas—highways, rail¬
roads, water supply, public buildings, town improvements, hydraulic and
electric works, posts and telegraphs.^
Guggisberg was a great advocate of the Boy Scout movement and under
his auspices, the government promoted the organization of Scout groups.
As the governor reported to the legislative council in 1923*
With regard to progress in elementary education in the past
year, a very definite advance has been made in character-training.
This is due to the fact that in all Government schools, and in
certain of the assisted schools, the development of the Boy Scout
movement has met with real success. It is difficult to paint in
words the results achieved, but if any Honourable Member has any
doubts on the subject let him visit the Senior Government Boy’s
School at 8:30 any morning. He will see the whole work of the
school, except the actual literary education, being carried out
by the scout leaders. He will see a rabble of boys suddenly
consolidate into an orderly parade, physical exercises carried
out, classes marched into the school rooms, and reports of
absentees made, all by the scout leaders. In addition to
unpunctuality, indiscipline, and other faults are dealt with
by the school courts-of-honour composed en-tirely of scouts.
The whole is proof of the great value of the scout movement
to this country.
^F. M. Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence (Stanford, Cali¬
fornia: Stanford University Press, I960), p. 27.
^F. G. Guggisberg, Gold Coast: A Review of Events 1920-26 and
Prospects of 1927-28 (Accra: Government Printing Press, 1927^*
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Much has been said of the danger of providing boys with
uniforms. The scout authorities are fully alive to this
and have taken such steps as will ensure that the uniform
takes second place to the spirit of the scout movement.^
One ordinance enacted in 1926 made it legal to search without a
warrant in certain cases when "he shall have reasonable ground for sus¬
pecting that the article has been stolen or otherwise unlawfully ob¬
tained."^
The first elected member of the legislative council took his seat in
1925» the year in which the colony also received a new constitution.^
Slater's Administration
Under Slater's governorship, the colonial government continued to
expand its association with voluntary groups. Agricultural cooperatives
were legalized in 1931* Under the auspices of the department of agricul¬
ture, the cooperatives had more than 10,000 members by 1938 in several
areas—cocoa, copra, fruit, citrus, coffee.^ The government policy after
organizing these groups was to train members in eventual self-management,
leaving the government staff free to instruct, supervise, and advise. As
one report says:
It was impossible to make members manage their own societies
all at once as patient instruction is needed and the intro¬
duction of such a measure must necessarily be gradual to avoid
^Gold Coast, Legislative Council Debates, 1923-24 (Accra: Govern¬
ment Press), pp. 57-58.
^Gold Coast, Ordinances of the Gold Coast, Ashanti, and Northern
Territories, and the British Sphere of Toqoland, 1926 (Accra: Govern¬
ment Printer, 1927)» No. 4. p. 238.
^Mansergh, et al.. Commonwealth Perspectives (Durham, N.C.: Duke
University Press, 1958), p. 127.
^Bourret, pp. 98-99.
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disasters^ but very considerable progress was made. All
money was handled by the members themselves; All decisions
were taken by members of General Meetings and ConnltteeSf
usually after a careful explanation had been given by a
member of the staff. Most societies fixed a special day
for their monthly meetings so that members would know which
day to attend and a member of the Government staff could
arrange to be there to Instruct and advise.^
During this period, about seventy savings banks were operated under
government auspices.^
Thomas's Administration
Governor Thomas continued to emphasize centralized planning, par¬
ticularly In the agricultural sector of the economy. The personal power
of the chief executive was expanded at this time over fierce African
opposition. Under Sir Shenton Thomas, agricultural development was
stressed In the depressed and backward Northern Territories. Following
the government's suggestion, some head chiefs set up model farms which
numbered twenty by the end of the thirties. These farms were stocked by
livestock and poultry from the veterinarian department at Tamale and were
managed by tribal elders.
The year 1934 Is noted for the passing of two ordinances, the sedi¬
tion ordinance and the waterworks ordinance which Involved the question
of taxation of those who benefitted from municipal water supplies. The
African members of the legislative council opposed this taxation, and part
®Go1d Coast, Report of the Department of Co-operation, 1945-46
(Accrat Government Printing Department, 1947), p. 4.
^Gold Coast, Gold Coast Colony Blue Book, 1931-32 (Accrat Govern¬
ment Printing Office, 1932), pp. 922-923*
^^Bourret, p. 20.
27
of the opposition lay in the fact that the bill left the control of the
water rate completely in the hands of the governor and his executive
council. Despite the protest by the African members, the legislative
council passed the bill with the usual vote of twenty to nine—twenty
ayes of the European official and unofficial members against the nine
nays of the natives. In a petition to the House of Commons, the Africans
wrote that *'the waterworks ordinance reeks with unfettered bureaucracy.*'^^
The amendment to the criminal code which dealt with sedition aroused even
more resentment on the part of the Africans. This amendment widened the
former definition of sedition and extended the manner in which it was to
be punished. The ordinance gave the governor power to prohibit the impor¬
tation of newspapers, books, and the like. If a prohibited book or other
matter was found in one's possession, he must prove to the court that "he
did not know the nature of the contents" or "that it came into his posses¬
sion without his knowledge or privity." The government had power to
examine packages. A seditious act was defined ast
An intention (1) to bring into hatred or contempt or to
excite disaffection against the person of His Majesty, His heirs
or successors or the Government of the Colony by law estab¬
lished..., (2) to excite His Majesty's subjects or inhabitants
of the Colony to attempt to procure the alteration, otherwise
than by lawful means of any other matter in the Colony..., (3)
to bring into hatred or contempt or to excite disaffection
against the administration of justice in the Colony, (4) to
raise discontent or disaffection amongst His Majesty's sub¬
jects or inhabitants bf the Colony, (5) to promote feelings of
ill will and hostility between different classes of the popu¬
lation of the Colony. It is not a seditious intention: (a)
to show that His Majesty has been misled or mistaken in any of
his measures; or (b) to point our errors or defects in the
government or constitution of the Colony as by law established
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or in legislation or in the administration of justice with
a view to the reformation of such errors or defects; or
(c) to persuade His Majesty's subjects**«to attempt to procure
by lawful means the alteration of any matter in the Colony*^^
The Africans were accustomed to having a sedition law, for the colony
had had such a statute since 1892, but they objected to the way in which
the new law differed from the sedition law in England. The provisions
meant that the governor could declare at any time any book, document, or
pamphlet to be seditious. Once he made such a pronouncement, it was out
of the competence of the jury or judge to determine whether such a book,
or document was actually seditious. All that the jury or judge could
determine was whether the book or document in question came into the cate¬
gory of publications prohibited by the governor. If it did, the court
had no alternative but to convict.Again the usual division followed
the presentation of the bill, a division reflecting the governor's con¬
viction! "I have no desire whatever to pass any legislation which is
opposed by the great majority of the people; but there are occasions where




Three areas were expanded under Governor Hodson—the personal power
of the chief executive, the continued governmental sponsorship of voluntary
12
Gold Coast, Ordinances of the Gold Coast, Ashanti, and Northern
Territories and Toqoland Under British Mandate, 1934 (Accra; Government
Printing Office, 1935)* No. 21.
13
George Padmore, Africa; Britain's Third Empire (London; Dennis
Dobson, Ltd., 1949), p. 199.
’\ight, The Gold Coast Legislative Council, p. 92.
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organizations, and centralized economic planning.
Governor Hodson used the sedition ordinance to suppress the incipi¬
ent nationalism that was manifested in the Gold Coast in his administra¬
tion. Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria and Hr. Wallace Johnson of Sierre
Leone, prominent West African journalists, then living in Accra, were
prosecuted for criticizing the British government. Charged with sedition,
they were both convicted, but later acquitted in a higher court. Padnore
says that these men, pioneers of *'pan-Africanism" and "home rule for
Africans," had to leave the Gold Coast due to the repressive conditions
then prevailing in the colony.
The attorney general presented an immigration restriction bill in
1937 which was duly passed; it gave the government power to deport or keep
out agitators not indigenous to the Gold Coast.
A Cocoa Control Board was organized in 1939 under the ministry of
food in London. Buying all the cocoa produced in the Gold Coast at
minimum prices set at the beginning of each season, the board then sold
the cocoa to overseas buyers. The official monopoly was transferred from
one body to another until it came to rest with the Gold Coast Cocoa
. 17
Marketing Board in 1947*
Hodson was faced with the problems concomitant with the outbreak of
World WarH during the latter part of his administration which began in
1934. The governor undertook the development of a radio broadcasting
^^George Padroore, The Gold Coast Revolution (London: Dennis Dobson,
Ltd., 1953), PP. 46-57.
Coast Legislative Council, p. 116.
’^Ward, pp. 402-403.
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system which proved to be a valuable means of spreading information and
of gaining the fullest native cooperation during the war period. Finding
widespread propaganda necessary for gaining whole-hearted civic parti¬
cipation, Hodson organized a department of information in 1939* Broad¬
casting facilities were available since the governor had installed
station ZOY at Accra in 1935, as well as smaller stations elsewhere in
the colony. The information department also used mobile motion picture
units which could travel into rural areas and published an illustrated
weekly newspaper, first called the Empire at War and then, Gol'd Coast
Buitetin.^^
Defense regulations promulgated in 1939 included an emergency powers
act which appointed a censor and established censorship, permitted restric¬
tion and detention orders, and gave the governor power to prohibit meetings
and processions, to impose a curfew, and to authorize arrest without a
warrant if the suspect was believed to have committed a war offense.
Trade union developments were sponsored by the government, with the
first law being enacted in 1940 under the impetus of the Colonial Develop¬
ment and Welfare Act. The British government appointed experienced British
trade unionists to undertake organizational work in the colonies, and this
decision resulted in the very rapid development of trade unions. Until
the 1941 Trade Unions and Trade Dispute Bill was enacted in the colony,
there were no unions in the Gold Coast. By 1951 there were forty-one
unions, and additions brought this number to seventy-five with a total
18
Bourett, pp. 142-146.
19^Gold Coast, The Laws of the Gold Coast, 1939 Legislation (Accrax
Government Printing Department, 1940), Defence Regulations.
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membership of 26,000 in 1953*^^
Burns* Administration
Governor Burns continued to administer in the forceful fashion of his
predecessors. Shortly after Burns' arrival in 1941, a series of strikes
broke out in the colony, and the governor records, "There were sympathetic
strikes and some disorders in other parts of the country, but each was
dealt with firmly as it occurred." He went on to say, "I am convinced
that if disorders are met firmly at an early stage, and with sufficient
force, much loss of life and damage to property can be averted." In
1942 public unrest again manifested itself in the rural areas where there
was an outbreak of chieftaincy disputes and associated disturbances. The
governor writes:
I made it plain that these disorders would not be permitted and
would be put down with a strong hand. The action I took, which
had a good effect, was to apply the Peace Preservation Ordinance
in any area where there had been rioting, which involved the
surrender of all firearms, and to station in that area, at the
expense of the community concerned, a strong body of poHce.^^
Burns concisely states his ideas of colonial rule, ideas which presumably
he put into action:
There is no need for slavish imitation of British methods
of election in all colonies and. Indeed, there is no reason for
thinking that the Westminister model must necessarily be the
best for a colonial legislature, without any adaptation to local
circumstances. Nor should governments hesitate, out of undue
20wa Iter Bowen, Colonial Trade Unions (London: Fabian Publications,
1954), p. 4.
2^Sir Alan Burns, Colonial Civil Servant (London: George Allen and
Unwin Ltd., 1949)» p. l^ST
^^Ibid.. p. 258.
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respect for "democracy'* to use such powers as they possess
(whether by an official majority In Council or through the
Governor's "reserve" powers), to put through measures for the
benefit of the public even In opposition to their "represen¬
tatives." I do not suggest that In minor matters such powers
should be used; not only would this be bad tactics but would
give the unofficial members no opportunity to learn from their
own mistakes. But where a major matter of policy, or a matter
of principle. Is at Issue, there Is every reason for firm action
by those really responsible for the welfare of the community;
such action will be styled highhanded and undemocratic but this
Is better than surrender to factious opposition, stirred up,
only too often. In the Interests of a few.^^
During the first year of the Burns administration, unofficial members
were admitted to the executive council for the first time. The next
constitutional development took place with the Implementation of a new
constitution. This constitution gave the legislative council power to
legislate for Ashanti and the Northern Territories, In addition to the
Gold Coast. Elected members, chosen by electoral colleges, were In the
majority for the first time; Ashanti was represented for the first time
while the Northern Territories remained unpresented. Executive power
still rested In the hands of permanent officials appointed by the governor,
who were responsible to the governor, not the legislative council, whose
most effective function was still to criticize. With the Introduction of
the elected principle, the governor was given reserve powers, powers to
enact bills over the heads of the elected majority "In the Interests of
2U
public order, public faith, or other essentials of good government."
Thus the legislature continued to fall under executive control, for the
governor's reserve powers are the constitutional analogue of the governor's
^^Ibld.. p. 292
Colonial Constitutions, p. 32.
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autocracy and the official majority in earlier stages of development
25
Nationalism
After World War II ended, * decade of nationalistic fervor in the
Gold Coast began* The United Gold Coast Convention, founded in 1947,
took advantage of the 1948 riots resulting from ex-servicemen's grievances
and popular discontent at rising prices, and stirred up political feelings.
During this period, the governor assumed wide emergency powers} removal
orders were made for six leaders of the U.G.C.C., including Kwame Nkrumah,
and deprived of access to judges, they were sent to the Northern Terri-
26
tories under preventive detention.
In the post-war period the government took interest in a five-year
development plan, particularly in laying plans for rural development. A
secretary was appointed to oversee these rural projects, the first of
which was a plan for the mechanized cultivation of groundnuts and other
crops. New villages were also planned, villages owning their equipment
and farming their land on a cooperative basis. Plans were also made for
a visit by a team of consultants to plan the development of the Volta River
system.
Nationalism continued to be a dominant theme throughout the closing
years of the forties. Journalists continued to be imprisonec^ I’o'' example,
Mr. Kwani Afriyie of the Morning Telegraph and Mr. K. A. Amegbe of the
^^Gold Coast, Annual Report of the Gold Coast, 1948 (Accra: Govern¬
ment Printer, 1948), p. 131•
^^Ibid.. pp. 5-30»
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Ghana Express* Mr. Gbedemah was arrested for writing an article indi¬
cating that British soldiers had been secretly sent to Takoadi to quell
an uprising, for African soldiers had proved to be unreliable since they
were not prepared to shoot their own people. In the article about the
alleged concentration of white soldiers at Takoadi, Gbederoah had written
that the British colonial government had been armed to the teeth. This
was regarded as seditious, and when he was tried as the editor of the
Accra Evening News, he was given a prison sentence of four months.^®
The governor. Sir Charles Arden-Clarke, declared a state of emergency
early in 1950. This made it unlawful for three or more persons to assemble
together, restricted freedom of mcvement, empowered the police to search
vehicles and possessions at the frontier without a search warrant, and
permitted censorship of mail. Nationalist descriptions of this period
call it a "veritable reign of terror". Leaders of the Convention People's
Party, including Nkrumah, Botsio, Hutton-Mi11s, Dennis, Welbeck, and
Quarshie, were arrested while their offices were raided and property con¬
fiscated; they were imprisoned on charges of inciting the workers to strike
illegally. The editor of the Accra Evening News, J. G. Harkham, was also
jailed for his article "Pull for the Shore," as was Kofi Baako for an
article in the Cape Coast Daily Mai 1 entitled "A Campaign of Lies"--an
article which criticized the colonial government's handling of news.
Terms of imprisonment ranged from six months to three years, with Kwame
Nkrumah drawing a sentence of three years for printing seditious articles
^®K. Budu-Acquah, Ghanat The Morning After (London: Goodwin Press
Ltd., 1962), p. 67.
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In his paper and for fomenting an illegal strike. At this, time, the
Accra Evening News, Nkrumah's newspaper, was banned. The C.P.P. was dis¬
paraged by radio broadcasts and in the Gold Coast Bulletin, both govern¬
ment subsidized, as a subversive organization without any real support from
the people.^®
As a result of the political unrest in the colony, the Burns' con¬
stitution of 1946 was replaced by another constitution in 1950. The greatest
constitutional changes deilt with the executive council; the executive
council remained responsible to the governor, not to the legislature; there
was no system of collective responsibility, although the legislature could
dismiss individual ministers; the leaders of the legislature, a member of
the executive council appointed by the governor, was elected by the execu¬
tive council to serve as leader of the legislative assembly. The change
in the executive council organization meant that departmental policy would
no longer be laid down by a permanent minister who could be criticized
but not dismissed, but a minister who would have to resign if defeated in
the assembly. The new legislative assembly of seventy-five members would
be half directly and half indirectly elected. This semi-responsible
government was headed by Nkrumah who was released from prison in order to
take his seat in the legislative assembly and in the executive council.
In 1952, he was renamed "prime minister" and the executive council, "cabi¬
net." The governor continued to hold reserve powers and to control defense
and external affairs.^^
^^Ibid.. pp. 69-73.




The 1954 constitution enlarged the single chamber legislature and
provided for the direct election of Its members. With this constitution,
the Gold Coast achieved complete Internal self-rule. This constitution




The administration In Ghana opted, and In some Instances It was led
by the exigencies of the situation, to take recourse to the only system
of rule of which It had first-hand knowledge and experience—the British
crown system. The Ghanaians accepted and expanded the authoritarian
tradition developed under the British administrators. The central govern¬
ment continued to exercise a policy giving priority to state Interests
over Individial liberties. The chief executive's powers continued to be
personalized not Institutionalized.
The Setting
At Independence, the Gold Coast officially took the name Ghana, the
name of a famous empire of western Sudan which flourished about 300*1240
A.D. The city of Ghana was located on the edge of the Sahara Desert.
This empire was established by Berbers or Jews who were superseded about
770 A.D. by Negro rulers. Although the first Ghana never Included the
Gold Coast, the present Akan-speaking Inhabitants claim to have come
from there. Ward writes, "It Is natural that, as national feeling
developed, Africans should have looked back to Ghana as the symbol of an
Africa that was culturally as well as politically Independent of Europe."^
^W. E. F. Ward, A History of Ghana (London* George Allen and Unwin
Ltd., 1958), pp. 32-50, 3^9.
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Ghana's area includes 91*843 square miles* mainly in the Volta
River Basin* Its three topographical strips correspond to its colonial
administrative divisions—an arid savannah (Northern Territories)* deep
tropical rain forest (Ashanti)* and a coastal plain with hills rising to
3000 feet (Gold Coast). The main cities are Accra (capital) with 400*000
inhabitants* Kumasia (capital of Ashanti) with 220*000 inhabitants*
Sekondi-Takoradi (seaport) with 120*000 inhabitants* and Tamale with
120*000 inhabitants* Ghana is divided administratively into eight regions
—Eastern Region* Volta Region* Northern Region* Central Region* Western
2
Region* Ashanti Region* Brong-Ahafo Region* and Upper Region*
q
The total population is 7*000*000 including 20,000 non-Africans*
The population* seventy per cent engaged in agriculture* is highly tri-
balized; fifty different languages are spoken* The Ashanti form the
biggest* most coherent tribe* and had it not been for the European advance
from the coastal region* the Ashantis would probably have unified all the
Akan peoples by extending their kingdom to the coast* Culturally, the
coastal and Ashanti peoples are similar, since both had European contacts,
but the northern area was relatively less advanced. The Moslem religion
predominated in the north, while the largest number of Christians lived
4
in Ashanti and the colon;^ together with a number of animists*
An examination of some figures for the period 1954-55 will serve as
a short account of the economic situation in Ghana* Total revenue was
^Ghana Fact Sheet, February 1, 1962 (New York* Ghana Information
Services), pp. 2-3*
3Ibid., p* 1*
London, The Times, March 5* 1957* p. 7*
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feSOfOOOyOOO and total expenditures ^79*000,000. Imports amounted to
fe71f000,000 and exports* 14*000*000. The principal exports were cocoa
(^85*000*000) and gold (410*000*000). Although the wealth of the country
increased* Ghana was still independent on a single exportable commodity-
cocoa.^
The Convention People's Party* under Kwame Nkrumah's leadership won
the general elections in 1950 even though opposition groups arose* espec¬
ially in Ashanti. Nkrumah* the first prime minister and the first presi¬
dent of Ghana* became actively engaged in the nationalist cause when he
returned to the Gold Coast in 1947 after living and studying for ten years
in the United States* and for a short time* England. His political
interests led him to work first with the United Gold Coast Convention under
Dr. J. B. Oanquah. Finding this group too quiescent* Nkrumah and other
dissident members broke with the U.G.C.C. and formed the Convention
People's Party in June* 1949. His decision marked the beginning of a new
type of nationalist movement in the colony* a movement which would appeal
to the politically awakened masses. Realizing the value of a simple
slogan—"Self-goverranent Now"—Nkrumah capitalized on his gifts of leader¬
ship* personal charm* and eloquence as he proceeded to organize party
cells all over the Gold Coast.^
Introducing his ideal of government in the preface of his auto¬
biography* Nkrumah writes:
Capitalism is too complicated a system for a newly
^Ibid.
^F. M. Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence (Stanford, Cali¬
fornia: Stanford University Press* 19^0)* pp. 172-174 and W. E. F.
Ward* A History of Ghana (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.* 1958)*
pp. 339-3^0,
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Independent nation. Hence the need for a socialistic society.
But even a system based on social justice and a democratic con¬
stitution may need backing up, during the period following
independence, by emergency measures of a totalitarian kind.^
The creation of a socialistic state meant the assumption of wide activi¬
ties and powers by those who govern. When this aim was coupled with the
aim of establishing a parliamentary form of government, it was evident
that problems would abound on every side. Having no workable indigenous
system of government with which to work, Nkrumah and his government
adopted and adapted the existing system, the only system they had ever
known and experienced—the colonial system. As Sarbah wrote fifty years
ago, **Due regard should be given to the fact that lines of advance are
settled in preceding ages, and it is vain to imagine or expect that
nations, small or great, civilized or otherwise* can discard their inheri-
0
tance and create their environment anew.*'
Development Plans
It is evident that plans for social and economic progress in Ghana
had their roots in Guggisberg's development plan in 1919* His plan seems
to have been the first in the British colonial empire and among the first
in the modern world to outline an integrated ten-year development plan.
Guggisberg made provision for surveys and research as well as actual
development work, including both economic and welfare aspects of develop¬
ment. As Niculescu says, "It would be difficult today in Ghana to mention
any major project, whether still under discussion or already implemented,
^Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana, The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah (New York:
Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1957), p. xvi.
0
John M. Sarbah, Fanti National Constitution (London: William Clowes
and Sons, Ltd., 1906), p. 121.
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which had not been investigated, sometimes in a fair amount of detail,
9
under the impulse of the 1919 plan."
Ghana's first plan for economic development (1957-59) emphasized
communications, public works, education, and general services. This
served as a foundation for the second development plan which stressed the
processing of agricultural products, the exploitation of mineral resources
and the manufacturing of products for which there was a market in Ghana,
the domestic sale of which assist the country's balance of payment.
In April, 1961, Nkrumah laid down the procedure for closer party
control over economic development. General development plans had to have
the C.P.P. central committee's approval before being given consideration
by the cabinet and then parliament*^^ The central committee of the C.P.P.
seemed to be a colonial executive council writ large in this matter, for
in the colonial period, the executive council had to approve matters of
policy before the legislative council could take action.
A great amount of publicity had been given to Ghana's efforts to
interest foreign investors in the Volta River scheme. As long ago as
1924, the Gold Coast government considered the possibility of aluminum
production on the Volta River. Commercial investigations were begun in
1938 by Duncan Rose, a South African, but these were interrupted by the
war. They were resumed in 1945, when a private company. West African
Aluminum Limited, was formed, with Rose as chairman to carry on the
^Barbu Niculescu, Colonial Planning: A Comparative Study (London:
George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1958), p. 64.
^^Comroonwea1th Affairs (Great Britain: Conservative Political Centre),
Auc^st-September, 1961), pp. 5-6.
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investigations.^^ This scheme could have meant the difference between
jogging along as a poor agricultural state with few mineral industrial
society. The project, technically sound, could give Ghana hydro-electric
power and the ability to smelt its own aluminum from large bauxite
deposits. The project, revolved around the matter of finance involving
about b300,000,000 and around the continuing world demand for aluminum,
12
for it would take ten years to develop full production.
In July, 1961, Nkrumah set up a compulsory saving scheme to help
balance the budget for that year. The plan required salary and wage-
earners to save forty per cent of all monthly incomes over blO in national
development bonds which would mature in ten years at two and one-half per
cent for ten years in bonds yielding four per cent interest. Ordinary
workers were to have their compulsory savings deducted at the source.
This was not the first instance of such a plan in the country, for the
Gold Coast Marketing Board, begun during the Second World War under
Hodson, imposed a system of indirect, compulsory saving on the cocoa
producers which continued. Earlier, under Governor Slater, the govern¬
ment had operated a substantial number of savings banks.
Voluntary Organizations
The party in power and the leading political organization in Ghana
was Nkrumaha's party, the Convention People's Party. The C. P. P. had
^^West Africa, February 20, I960, p. 140.
^^The Times (London), June 6, 1957), p. 11.
'^Ronald Segal, African Profiles (Harmondsworth, England} Penguin
Books, Ltd, 1962), p. 229.
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about 1,700,000 members; it directed and controlled the activities of
these groups: the Trades Union Congress, the United Ghana Farmers'
Council, the National Council of Ghanaian Women, The Legion of Ghana
(ex-servicemen's group), the Ghana Young Pioneer Movement, the Co-operative
Movement, and the Builders Brigade. A C.P.P. membership card entitled
its bearer to belong to any of these organizations. Kwame Nkrumah was
the party's life chairman and general secretary. The Accra Evening Star
was by then the main newspaper of the C.P.P. It was at times difficult
to disengage the party structure from the governmental structure, and
what would be termed voluntary association groups in the West. As Nkrumah
said to a party seminar at the Winneba Ideiological Training Institute,
•We represent the Party, we represent the Government, we represent the
Nation, and we represent the people.
The Builders Brigade, started in 1957, enlisted Ghanaians volun¬
tarily in a military-type organization and taught them how to build simple
buildings, plant crops, and use agricultural equipment. Put into use
first in the north, the group's main purpose was to absorb the unemployed
Ghanaian, to teach him simple skills and to persuade him that manual
labor was honorable and a part of good citizenship. Both men and women
enlisted for a two year period. They were provided with uniforms, living
quarters, and were paid six shillings per day with one shilling deducted
for food. By 1959 there were about 7,000 members. The government
originally stated that it envisioned the enlistment of about 10,000 recruits,
but this figure was raised by Nkrumah to 25,000.^^ The first site the
^\he Party. No. 22, April 1-15, 1962, p. 3.
^%he Ghana Report (New York: G. H. Whittman, 1959), p. 219.
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Brigade worked on was Daraongo, an area originally selected for develop¬
ment by the West Africa groundnuts committed in 1948 to study large-
scale agricultural mechanization. At that time, 8,430 acres were
cleared, but only 100 acres were cultivated. The brigade settled in
communal plots prepared under the direction of the department of agri¬
culture and similar to those in the 1948 development plans.
The Young Pioneer Movement was another weapon in Ghana's drive to
capture the allegiance of all its citizens to the government's strenuous
efforts at modernization. The leaders of this group hoped to mobilize
all the nation's youth in support of the Nkrumah program, 'Vork and
Happiness." The Pioneer program had plagiarized Christian as well as
communist slogans and techniques. Hymns and litanies were rewritten to
extol loyalty to the state and to further build the cult of infallibility
about their leader, Nkrumah. The Pioneers used compulsory tactics in
their drive to bring into their organization or under their influence all
other youth groups in Ghana. The Boy Scouts, the Future Farmers, and
religious youth groups had been amalgamated into the Young Pioneers. The
school system, for which the churches had considerable responsibility, was
a prime target for its penetration.'^ The Pioneers aimed to instill into
the youth a high regard for the great virtues of patriotism and unselfish
service to the country and to the conrniunity, while at the same time pro-
18
viding opportunities for recreation. The government budget for I963
Times (London), November 1, 1957, p. 8.
'^George W. Shepherd, "Loyalties in the Emerging Nations," The
Christian Century, February 13, 1963, pp. 205-206.
18'“Ghana, Parliamentary Debated, Vol. 21 I960 (Accra: Government
Printing Department, I961), p. 184.
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allocated this group ^50,000 for uniforms, the single highest item
19
after salaries. Government interest in and sponsorship of youth groups
dates back to the Guggisberg administration when Boy Scouts played an
important rote in government schools.
The United Ghana Farmers' Council Co-operatives planned to establish
thirty-two settlement farms throughout the country by the end of 1963.
The central government itself planned to establish about 100 state farms
during this same period. All government agricultural stations were to be
transferred into state farms in order to arrest the pre-independence
policy of importing agricultural products. Crops such as rubber, oil,
palms, citrus, avocado pears, kila nuts, tobacco, rice, and vegetables
were grown on 1,500 acre farms. A seven-man coimittee was to be elected
by the workers themselves to discuss production, welfare services, recruit
ment of labor, and general management. A management committee was to
plan production and the up-keep of each farm.^^ These plans had ante¬
cedents in Slater's administration in the thirties and in the 1948 develop
ment plan.
John Tettegah, general secretary of the Trades Union Congress, des¬
cribes the T.U.C. and the C.P.P. as "two arms on a single body." Ever
since the beginning of the struggle for independence, Tettegah says, the
relations of the two organizations had been ideal and typically friendly
and constructive. He continues:
The leader of the Party and the leaders of the Ghana
Labor Movement have long been comrades in arms. Over these
^^Ghana Today, January 16, 1963 (London: Information Section of
the Ghana Office), p. 6.
20lbi_d., January 2, 1963, p. 9.
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years our relations have been so c1ose» our objectives so identi>
cal, that there has never been the need to emphasize the differ¬
ences between the C.P.P. and the T.U.C. In fact, there is only
a division of labor between us. On everything else—poli ti cs,
economics, industrial development, social problems, international
affairs—we stand united in a common bond. For us why should
there be a conflict because fundamentally and directly both of
us serve the same master--the working people of Ghana.
This close alliance between the controlling party and the labor organiza¬
tion meant that the government's economic policy was reflected in the
attitude of the trade union movement.
The Industrial Relations Act of 1958 structured the union-government
relations in Ghana. The minister of labor and co-operatives, Mr. Ako
Adeji, said it attempted "to lay down the foundation of such relations
between employees that will give maximum protection to the rights of the
workers of Ghana while reducing to the minimum the interference with the
smooth running of industry." He goes on to say that in this way the
government's socialist policy of support for the worker in all his legiti¬
mate claims for self-improvement were to be co-ordinated with the govern¬
ment's policy of encouraging industrialization and investment in new
industries as essential parts of the plan for economic independence.^^
This bill goes beyond merely establishing central control; it made it
difficult for workers in a dispute to walk out on strike in furtherance
of their aims. The collective bargaining machinery in the form of a
standing negotiating committee was intact. In cases of deadlock, the
minister of labor and co-operatives retained the right to use the con¬
ciliation procedure. However, if conciliation failed, the minister
^^The Ghana Report, p. 234.
^^Ghana, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 21, 545-546.
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acquired the power, on the consent of one party to a dispute, to direct
that the issues should be referred for arbitration. If one side was in
favor of arbitration, the minister could compel the other side to conform
and to submit to any arbitration award. Unions could not strike until
four weeks after the minister had requested an agreement on arbitration;
they could not strike at all if either side consented to arbitration.
23
The same law applied to management if it desired to stage a lockout.
One apologist for this bill writes;
The crucial point is that should we at this stage of our
national development and reconstruction ever and in anywhere
allow the workers of Ghana to resort frivolously to strikes
in order to defend their rights? At a time »Jien we are trying
to do in ten years what others have done in a hundred years,
frivolous strikes can be allowed only wherq and when their cup
of suffering is overflowed.24
Government interest in and control of labor unions can be traced back to
the fact that unions in the Gold Coast were developed under the aegis
of the government, and that colonial governors took a personal interest
in strikes, dealing with such incidents with a firm hand.
The Role of the Executive
In the realm of political developments, as in the area of social and
economic progress, it is evident that there was no great psychological
watershed at independence. Things changed very little beneath the sur¬
face. The strong executive was still very much in evidence, as was the
highly centralized form of government. The authoritarian tradition of
^^The Ghana Report, p. 235*
Budu-Acquah, Ghana; The Morning After (London; Goodwin Press,
Ltd., 1962), p. 107.
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subordinating individual rights to the interest of the state continued
into Nkrumah's administration» often with the same justifications previ¬
ously given by the colonial adbninistrators.
A few months after independence. Prime Minister Nkrumah moved into
Christianborg Castle, the residence of British governors since 1902. The
reasoning behind this move was that it was necessary action because
otherwise the mass of people might remain unconvinced that imperial con¬
trol had really ended. It was felt that the popularly elected leader
must be seen to occupy the former seat of power. Nkrumah's birthday
also became a national holiday, and his likeness was engraved on coins and
stamps vihile statues of him occupied prominent positions such as the lawn
before Parliament House. When Nkrumah announced that he was full execu¬
tive director of the C.P.P. as chief secretary and chairman of the party's
central committee, it became evident that this was an instance of over¬
lapping directorship—the term applied to a situation where the chief
executive of the state and ruling party are embodied in the same person.
In such situations, it is not easy to ascertain where the party leaves off
and the government begins.
An examination of the legal provisions of the i960 republican con¬
stitution which dealt with the executive shows the vesting of wide powers
in a president who was both titular head of state and the exclusive source
of the executive power of the state. Elected indirectly, the president
was indirectly responsible to the people. He had power to exercise the
executive power of the state with the assistance of ministers whom he
appointed. The president was also part of the parliament, and no bill
passed by the National Assembly could become law without his assent.
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The president, Nkrumah, exercised the powers which, under the 1957 con¬
stitution, were divided between the governor-general and the prime
minister. Pre-republican enactments that were still In force gave him
powers once held by the secretary of state, the governor, the governor
In-councll, the governor-general, and the prime minister; If such an
enactment referred to the queen. It was treated as a reference to the
president.
The white paper on the draft constitution made It clear that the
proposed I960 constitution had as Its aim strong and efficient government.
To achieve this end the president was given powers which Include power
to appoint the chief justice and judges of the superior courts, power to
revoke the appointment of a judge as chief justice, power to appoint an
attorney-general, power to give directions to the attorney-general, power
to evoke the appointment of the attorney-general, power to discipline all
judicial officers and executive officers of the judiciary other than
26
judges of the supreme court and the high court.
An Interesting provision of the Presidential Elections Act of I960
was that In order for a presidential nomination to be valid, the nomina¬
tion must Include this declaration:
We, the undersigned, hereby declare that the person nominated
by this notice has consented to the nomination and that we have
reason to believe and do believe that at the forthcoming General
Election candidates exceeding In number one-half of the number
of seats In the National Assembly will declare their preference
for that persons.27
^^Leslle Rubin and Pauli Murray, The Constitution and Government of




Anyone signing a nomination knowing the declaration to be false was
guilty of a criminal offense and liable to imprisonment for five years.
Some commentators felt that the requirements for a valid nomination,
together with the severe criminal sanction which accompanied it, may well
keep the number of presidential aspirants very low indeed. Anyone nomi¬
nating a person for the presidency would have to be assured that the
presidential candidate had the support of at least fifty-three candidates
in the election.^®
The i960 constitution of Ghana seems to be the only constitution
known which conferred special recognition on the first president of the
republic and granted him special powers. During the first year of the
republic, Nkrumah, officially titled Osagyefo (warrior-Saviour), was
given power to repeal and amend laws passed by parliament. Under Article
55, Nkrumah was given extra-ordinary power, not merely during his first
term of office, but for as long as he continued to be president. Given
the power to give directions by legislative instrument, Nkrumah could
give directions whenever he believed that it was in the national interest
to do so, and it was not competent for any court to inquire whether his
belief was justifiable. The directions, subject to constitutional pro¬
visions could relate to any subject; therefore a legislative instrument
could amend any act of the constituent assembly, as an act of parliament,
29
a statutory instrument, and any pre-republican enactment, implicitly.





in lieu of a formal bill of rights:
On accepting the call of the people to the high office of
President of Ghana I .solemnly declare my adherence
to the following fundamental principles—that the powers of
government spring from the will of the people and should be
exercised in accordance therewith; that freedom and justice
should be honoured and maintained; that the union of Africans
should be striven for by every lawful means and, when attained,
should be faithfully preserved; that the Independence of Ghana
should not be surrendered or diminished on any ground other than
the furtherance of African unity; that no person should suffer
discrimination on ground of sex, race, tribe, religion or poli¬
tical belief; that chieftaincy in Ghana should be guaranteed
and preserved; that every citizen of Ghana should receive his
fair share of the produce yielded by the development of the
country; the subject of such restrictions as may be necessary for
preserving public order, morality, or health, no person should be
deprived of freedom of religion or speech, or the right to move and
assemble without hindrance or of the right of access to Courts of
law; that no person should be deprived of his property save where
the public interest so requires and the law so provides.30
The principles embodied in this declaration were made in the form of
a declaration of personal adherence and not as guarantees and prohibitions
binding on all state organs. The constitution said nothing as to specific
constitutional remedies where violations of these rights might occur.
The president was able to control political parties and other groups.
No group could organize and participate in an election if the president
declared such an organization illegal or prohibited. A group might be
so declared if it was established for the purpose of "advancing the
interests of a particular racial, tribal, or similar group, or a religious
faith." The president had power to control the use and registration of
flags and symbols of political parties, as well as registration of their




Executive Powers According to Legislative
Enactment
The Emergency Powers Act of 1961 was preceded by a similar act in
1957» an act which was a renewal of the emergency act common to the
colonial period. The 1961 version gave the president power to proclaim a
national or local state of emergency by legislative instrunent, with the
approval of his cabinet. Closely following the working of the 1920
Emergency Powers Act, except that the chief executive could no longer
suspend any part of the constitution, the 1961 act defined emergency as
"any emergency arising out of any action taken or immediately threatened
whether in or outside Ghana by any person or persons and from its nature
or scale likely to be prejudicial in Ghana to the public safety or public
order or public health, or to deprive any substantial portion of the com>
munity of the essentials of life, or to interfere in any way with Govern-
ment services, and also included any emergency arising out of an event
due to natural causes with or without human intervention."^^ Under this
act the president had the general power with cabinet approval to make
regulations for securing public safety and the defense of Ghana, the
maintenance of public order; he had power to detain or restrict'the move¬
ment of persons and power to deport or exclude aliens, to authorize the
entering and searching of any premises, to authorize taking possession and
control of property, and to authorize the amendment or suspension of any
law other than the constitution. The president was able to exercise wide
emergency powers without the approval of the National Assembly, for the
legislature no longer had to confirm presidential regulations within
3^Ibid.. p. 203
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twenty-eight days or they cease to have effect, as was the case under
the 1957 constitution.^^ Thus, the president declared emergencies in
Kumasai, the Northern Region, Accra, Dormaa State, Ho and Kpandu districts
for varying lengths of timet. The president felt it necessary, as did his
colonial predecessors, to use the borad powers granted him under the
emergency provisions.
The Public Order Act of 1961 gave the minister of the interior power
to regulate the possession and carrying of firearms, to control public
meetings and processions, and to impose curfews. Under this act, the
police could arrest without warrant if the person was suspected of vio-
34
lating the act. The ministry of the interior was taken over by Nkrumah
in 1958, for he felt it was a period when it was necessary that the govern¬
ment should be firm and extremely resolute; at this time, following the
United Party's decision to boycott the elections to Ghana's regional
assent)!ies, the government decided to withhold its permission for the U.P.
to hold any public meetings until after elections, except for one rally
previously arranged.
The Criminal Code of I960 empowered the president to require periodi¬
cals suspected of "systematic publication of matter calculated to
prejudice public order or safety, or the maintenance of the public services
or economy of Ghana to submit all future issues of the periodical to a
specified authority to be passed upon before publication." In 1961 the
^^Ibid.. pp. 203-229.
^Sbid.. p. 204.
3^est Africa, October 4, 1958, p. 951*
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Ashanti Pioneer Instrument effectively muzzled that newspaper.Pro¬
visions dealing with censorship date back to Clifford's administration
during World War I. Again with the outbreak of World War II, censor¬
ship was provided for under the emergency powers act. A few years
earlier, several journalists were forced to quit the Gold Coast; this
occurred again after the war when journalists who supported the nationalist
cause were imprisoned for writing seditious articles. During the first
year of the Nkrumah administration, one British correspondent was first
forbidden to leave the country, then after leaving, forbidden to re-enter
Ghana; writs of attachment were issued against the Ashanti Pioneer; Mr.
Timothy, editor of the Daily Graphic and correspondent for The Observer,
was deported.^^
Mr. L. R. Abvana, minister of information and broadcasting, said
that it was the sacred mission of the press to inform, educate, and guide
the people. He posited that it was the responsibility of the press to
ensure that it did not become a dangerous institution confusing the
people it served and embarrassing the authorities it was meant to assist
and whose policies it was designed to explain.In the summer of 1961
Nkrumah himself took over the direction and supervision of Ghana's broad-
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casting system. This move had a precedent in the action taken by
Governor Hodson when he took over the development and control of the first
broadcasting system in the colony.
36Les1ie Rubin and Pauli Murray, The Constitution and Government of
Ghana, pp. 203-204.
37The Times (London), 1957»
3QGhana Today, December 5, 1962, p. 3»
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Commonwealth Affairs, August-September, 1961, pp. 5-6.
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As was the case with the Asantehene, Prempeh in I895 and the German
merchants and missionaries during World War 1, the government had the
power to deport as did the government under the 1937 immigration restric¬
tion bill which permitted the deportation or barring entry of undesirable
persons not indigenous to the country. The Deportation Act of 1957 pro¬
vided that no citizen of Ghana was to be deported. Deportation was allowed
if a person was convicted by the court of an offense for which the court
had power to impose a sentence of imprisonment, and the court so recom¬
mended. Any person to be deported "may be arrested without warrant and
be detained in legal custody under the authority of the Minister until
he was dealt with."^^ A person could be remanded in custody from time to
time at intervals of not more than twenty-eight days. Nkrumah said that
deportations were necessary because Ghana obviously had to deal with
conditions quite unlike those in many other countries; thus, the govern¬
ment must adopt methods appropriate to the problems that must be solved.
Speaking of the 1957 ordinance, he said that it "simply renewed the powers
previously possessed and exercised by the old colonial government." Con¬
tinuing, he said, "But 1 emphasise again that Government is determined to
preserve law and order, and will not tolerate subversive activities in
any form. My government will not hesitate to act if unlawful or sub-
versive--and I repeat the words unlawful and subversive—methods are
4l
used to undermine it." Deportation orders were stringently enforced
^®Ghana, Ordinances and Acts of Ghana, 1957 (Accra: Government
Printing Press, 1961), p. 113»
4l ,
Kwame Nkrumah, I Speak of Freedom (New York: Frederick Praeqer,
1961), p. 113.
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against what the authorities term non-Ghanaians suspected of antl-
government activity. Deportees were tagged with the nebulous phrase
"persons whose presence was not conducive to the Interest and security
of Ghana." There was little difference between such a phrase and that
of the colonial administrator's "order and good government." Soon after
1ndependence> the government began to deport residents of Ghana--Mr.
Bankole Timothy, editor of the Dally Graphic, two men from Kumasal (one
the chairman of the Muslim Association Party In Ashanti), the tribal
head of the Gao comnunlty by Kumasal and the tribal head of the Moshle
community of Kumasal, other tribal figures, and four Lebanese (one from
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a well-known family In Kumasla where a street was named after him).
In 1958 deportation orders were applied to about I50 persons and in 1959
to about 75*^^
As a consequence of the deportation act, the legislature enacted the
Indemnity Act of 1958 which prevented all Judicial inquiry into acts
which might conceivably have serious consequences for their perpetrators.
Since no order of a minister was subject to appeal or reviewed In any
court, the act enabled the executive to effectively protect Itself from
any Inquiry Into Its conduct such as might follow from a series of cases
In which that conduct was found to be unjustified by the circumstance It
was Intended to meet.^
^^The Times (London), 1957*
^^Ghana, Subsidiary Legislation, 1958, 1959 (Accra: Government
Printer, 1959).
Budu-Acquak, Ghana: The Morning After, p. IO3
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The Sedition Act of 1959» with minor changes, read almost as the
1934 version in its definition of treason and sedition.^^
The Preventive Detention Act, promulgated in 1958, empowered the
president to detain any citizen of Ghana if he deemed it necessary due to
the person acting in any way prejudicial to the defense of Ghana, the
relations of Ghana with other states, or the security of the state.
Going into effect for five years, the law provided for a detention period
of up to five years.In 1958 about forty-two persons were detained
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under the act. Included in this group were all the members of the
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Accra executive committee of the opposition United Party. Eighty U.P.
members were included in the 118 arrested under this act in 1960.^^ In
1961 fifty opposition leaders were arrested in October.^®
Nkrumah appointed five HP's to become regional commissioners having
ministerial rank in October, 1957. As the representatives of the central
government in their region, they were personally and directly responsible
to the government for the administration of their region. Ghana did not
change overnight, and if the commissioner was needed in the past, he would
be needed for some time to come. The white scaffolding was being replaced
by black scaffolding. In the case of the regional commissioners who in
^^Ghana, 1959 Acts of Ghana and the First Half-Year, I960 (Accra:
Covernment Printer, 1961), No. 64.
^Leslie Rubin and Pauli Murray, The Constitution and Government
of Ghana, p. 230.
^^Ghana, Subsidiary Legislation, 1958.
^^The Ghana Report, p. 5.
^^The New York Times, December 24, I960, p. 2.
^^Ronald Segal, African Profiles, p. 231*
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1961 became regional secretaries to the C.P.P, in their region (another
instance of overlapping directorship), this move seemed to portend an
attempt at or reversion to centralized control such as the British prac¬
ticed when appointing regional and district commissioners. A total of
156 district commissioners, responsible to the regional commissioners,
had been posted for duty throughout the country by early 1963.^^
The Opposition
Organized opposition groups were almost non-existent in Ghana.
Under the I960 constitution, the reorganized legislature gave physical
expression to a political fact—that there was no government or opposi¬
tion side in the U-shaped chamber. Mr. Botsio had declared that the
central feature of the British parliamentary system—the loyal opposition
—could never operate in Ghana.On the contrary, the only requisites,
as the president views the problem, for parliamentary democracy were
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periodic elections and universal adult suffrage.
There was truth in the assertion that the concept of an organized
opposition and the use of the term "opposition" are relatively unknown in
Ghana, and hence, confusing to the people. It was evident during the
colonial period, there was little patience with view other than those
officially held by the governor and his officials. A non-tolerant attitude
towards any but the official party and government view became evident soon
after independence. Those in power seemed to be hearkening to the parting
^^Ghana Today, January 2, 1963, p. 8.
^^est Africa, July 9, I960, p. 757.
^^Kwame Nkrumah, I Speak of Freedom, p. I56.
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words of Governor Hodson when he said of the future, “you may have elec¬
tion campaigns and party functions, and politicians seeking election for
their own advancement, and not really for the good of this country...
and you will pine for the peace and security of our present form of
government."^^ A month after independence, Nkrumah said that he could
efficiently discharge public business and was in no need of “unsolicited
advice from political theoreticians who never held office.^^ Take his
cue, within a year the government-sponsored Guinea Times printed editior-
ials in a similar vein:
We concede to Or. Danquah the right to his opinion on any
subject and to state, however weird or ludicrous it may be....
Dr. Busia stated, according to his own mental twist....But the
opposition has shown in so demonstrable a manner that it com¬
prises men of puny minds who are totally incapable of any
vestiage of magnanimity. They are very vindictive. The leaders
of the opposition are men of childish mentality. They are very
vindictive. They do not, therefore, expect anyone to behave in a
humanitarian and responsible manner. Kwame Nkrumah is very large-
hearted. He is able to draw a line between politics and a situa¬
tion that calls for human sympathy. And that is why he will always
succeed whilst his opponents remain peevish, and intransigent...
Dr. Busia considers himself and his colleagues more honest, more
efficient, and more democratic than the leader of the C.P.P. This
is a mere hallucination. Vis-a-vis current events in Ghana even
a congenital idiot could have said better....On the eve of the
election when it was expected that reason would prevail the Parlia¬
mentary Leader of the Opposition had the impudence to talk about
inefficiency, dishonesty, and dictatorship on the part of the
Government and the C.P.P. Only the featherbrained could be taken
in by this fairy tale....The truth is that the leaders of the
Opposition have no respect either for constituted authority or the
law. Nor is that all. They are vindictive and extremely ruthless.
These men are not to be trusted with any measure of power whatso¬
ever. The liberties of the people would be destroyed the moment
they gain any form of political control. What with honesty, there
Wiseman, “The Gold Coast: The Transition of Self-Government,*'
Part II, Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. X, No. 2 (Spring, 1957), p. 200.
^^The Times (London), April 18, 1957, p. 9.
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Is ample evidence to show that the opposition Is rougish,
palpably dishonest and adept at contriving cunning ways of
blanketing Its vices....The C.P.P. Is better able to look
after the welfare of the people just as It Is the party which
won Independence for Ghana....It Is not the fault of the Govern¬
ment If It did not consult the Opposition, for the latter has
given eloquent proof of nothing but mental sterility.5°
56Guinea Times (Accra), 1958
CONCLUSIONS
To what extent is Ghanaian authoritarianism traceable to British
colonial rule? The areas analyzed in this study do not include all areas
of Ghanaian life; consequently, any conclusions presented cannot be defini>
tive. Many factors relate the colonial to the republican government, but
only with further study of the pattern of governmental development can the
matter of causality be evaluated with any validity.
The strong executive continued to characterize government in inde¬
pendent Ghana, opposition being almost non-existent, as was the case under
British rule. The legal and extralegal allocation of power to the presi¬
dent embodied the range of power formerly held by the governor, extending
this as well in some cases, e.g., the broad provisions of the Emergency
Powers Act. As was the case with British governors, the chief executive
was not directly responsible to the voters. Not being directly account¬
able to the voters, nor in any way having to circumscribe governmental
excesses under the scrutiny of an opposition, the president of Ghana
wielded a very strong arm.
The chief executive in Ghana retained the special aura of earlier
colonial governors. British governors had projected an air of infalli¬
bility derived from their triad of functions--ru1er, envoy, and civil
servant. Nkrumah also fitted into this pattern, for his personality was
sacrosanct aura as a result of his leading role in the struggle for inde¬
pendence, his leadership of the party, his leadership of the nation, and
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his leadership in the greater struggle for African independence and unity.
Thus, the power of the executive continued to be personalized, not insti¬
tutionalized. Loyalty to the state became identified with loyalty to the
leader. The leader nurtured this cult of the personality by continuing
to fight the battle which began as the struggle for independence. Imbued
with a militant sense of infallibility, the leader was likely to take any
uninvited criticism as an attack against the nation, the rule of law, and
consequently to consider it subversion. Hence, the distress and disgust
of the acininistration at any su;:h attacks and the willingness to take
prompt punitive action.
It was no innovation fcx* the government, which was so closely identi¬
fied with the C.P.P. to sponsor and regulate voluntary organizations; for
labor unions, youth groups, and cooperatives were originally organized
under the aegis of the colonial government. Likewise, the governmental
control of the mass media of communication dates back to the colonial
period when the governor h.tmself controlled the broadcasting system and
kept close check on the press.
Ghana was, and still is, primarily dependent on agriculture with
cocoa as the basic export. Realizing that a one-crop economy did not
lend itself to a continually stable economic situation, the government
planned to diversify agriculture and to begin the process of industriali¬
zation. Centralized economic planning had been adopted to implement these
goals; colonial administrators first introduced this method in Ghana.
The white scaffolding was replaced by a black scaffolding. The
government in Ghana was often operated in a fashion similar to the pat¬
tern established in the colonial period of the country. The government
continued the system of promoting state Interests at the expense of the
Individual, setting restrictions and regulations which do not permit an
opposition to flourish, attempting to perpetuate the government viewpoint
In every Instance. Nkrumah, founder of the one-party state In Ghana, says
'*Let us rid ourselves of the false notion that democracy necessarily rests
In supporting multiple factions warring within the bosom of a divided
nation.*'^
The political temper of Ghana did not drastically change with the
coming of Independence. The newly won freedom meant the end of foreign
domination, not the birth of civil liberties. Why was the central govern¬
ment still the seat of a great concentration of power as It was In colon¬
ial days? Why did the tradition of a strong executive heading an
authoritarian government persist with the advent of Independence? A
summary of some goals of the government plus the solutions to certain
problems will facilitate an understanding of the exercise of the one-party
state In Ghana.
First, the Ghanaians were faced with the same problems as the Bri¬
tish faced, but the new leaders did not change the earlier colonial
solutions. Like the colonial administrators, the government of Ghana
chose authoritarian methods to deal with the problems It faced. The
government undertook a program of centralized economic planning In Its
attempts to diversify agriculture and to Industrialize. The mass of the
population had gathered little political experience under crown colony
^Kwame Nkrumah, Speech to the National Assembly, October 2, 1962
(New York* Ghana Information Services), p. 3>
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rule; it was not until after World War II that Ashanti was represented
on the legislative council, and not until 1954 did the Northern Terri¬
tories have elected representatives in the legislature. Thus, the strong
executive and highly centralized system of government may be explained
by apologists as necessary guidance for a politically immature people.
Wight noted a tendency still evident in Ghana—a tendency for many Afri¬
cans to care not about the existence of a paternalistic regime, but its
results.
Second, some of the governmental goals did not change after the colon¬
ial days. Nkrumah's "happy, progressive and prosperous country" differs
little from the earlier administrators' "prosperity of the Gold Coast".
Prosperity entails internal stability and economic advancement both now
and in earlier periods under British rule. Stability and advancement
were being pursued in a manner similar to that of the colonial adminis-
trations--economic development plans, government monopolies of cocoa,
public order legislation, discouragement of any opposition. Nkrumah had
enlarged the list of colonial goals to include two new goals perculiar
to this period in Ghana--!nternal unity and continental or African unity.
Internal unity was being pressed on a people divided until after World
War II. In this country, so long divided as a colony, the government was
trying to inculcate a sense of unity in all the citizens, beginning, par¬
ticularly, with the youth--for example, all children in public schools
recited the pledge of allegiance twice each day. Nkrinnah contended that
the independence of Ghana was meaningless unless it was linked with the
total liberation of the whole African continent. He and his government
were therefore encouraging the push toward independence of other African
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countries* At the same time* Nkrumah was actively promoting the event¬
ual unification of independent African states which he maintained would
eliminate the danger of the balkanization of the continent by foreign
interests.
The government continued to govern as did its colonial predecessors.
Nkrumah had consolidated his power since being elected chief executive.
As head of the budget bureau* chief secretary of the C.P.P. and chairman
of the party's central committee* while also serving as president of
Ghana* Nkrumah wielded a vast amount of power* potentially and actually*
In a country where colonial administrators had for long enjoyed con¬
siderable autonomy* it should come as no surprise to find this authori¬
tarian tradition still in existence and flourishing after the colonial
period. Nkrumah said* and his British predecessors would agree* "the
first duty of a Government is to govern." Nkrumah felt that the preser¬
vation of internal security was of paramount concern* that the state
interests must be given priority in every instance as he continued to
fight Ghana's second revolution* an economic revolution. The first revo¬
lution* the winning of independence* was not an end in itself* but the
means to what he terms the economic and social emancipation of the people.
In this battle he would brook no interference!
Today we are joined within an all-embracing national per¬
sonality. We are Ghanaians* knit together by one flag* one
party* one parliament and one president with a unitary Ghana....
We must work as an organic whole* not only to hold our own against
the onslaughts of those who desire our downfall* but to further
that second revolution of which we embarked when we took the road
of independent nationhood.3
^Kwame Nkrumah, I Speak of Freedom (New Yorkx Frederick Praeqer.
1961)* p. 113.
3Kwame Nkrumah* Speech to the National Assembly, October 2, 1962. p. 2.
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In order to maintain internal security in a country with a heritage
of disorder on the part of the opposition, the government felt justified
when taking stringent security measures, those same measures that the
British applied to the Ghanaians in the period of growing nationalism.
The histories of many officials in Ghana show that much of their experience
with the British colonial administration was of a punitive nature as they
fell within the scope of censorship restrictions, deportation orders, pre>
ventive detention orders, and the like. Stringent measures were taken by
colonial administrators in order to promote the state's interests when
they felt their security threatened, particularly in times of war. The
government of Ghana continued to exhort in terms of struggle and revolu¬
tion; thus, it justified the stringent measures as means of protecting
the best interests of the state. Such stringent measures are better
termed arbitrary actions, an integral part of the authoritarian tradition
of Ghana. Authoritarian is here defined as the advocating of the principle
of obedience of government as opposed to the freely permitted exercise of
individual liberties. Individual liberties include the right to form a
parliamentary opposition, the right of the press to comment freely, the
right of the citizen to be respected by the police, and the expectation
of a judiciary free of executive control.
For more than a century, the British pursued a policy which gave
priority to state interests at the expense of individual liberty in any
given situation. The tendency toward arbitrary action on the part of the
executive, the close governmental control of voluntary organizations, and
the centralized economic planning were supplements to the basic policy of
putting state interests first. In Ghana, it was logical, expedient, and
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inevitable that the national leaders should and have taken recourse
to the only system of rule of which they had first-hand-knowledge—the
British crown colony system as it operated in the Gold Coast—in their
efforts to maintain internal stability while dynamically pursuing eco¬
nomic progress. Whether the authoritarian one-party system evident in
Ghana resulted directly from the British colonial experience is a ques¬
tion that will remain unanswered until further study can be made in Ghana
and other former British colonies. The evidence provided here certainly
suggests strongly that this was indeed the case.
The writer of this thesis regrets the fact that it was not possible
to secure the source authored by Henry Britton, The Rise and Fall of
Kwame Nkrumah, as suggested by advisors. However, it is thought that
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